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Revisiting Canada’s Sub-Central Coverage under the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement  
 
 
David Collins∗ 
 
ABSTRACT:   This article explores the recent changes to Canada’s sub-central 
government procurement commitments under the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) 
Agreement on Government Procurement (‘GPA’).  As a result of bilateral 
negotiations between Canada and the US, Canada has finally committed all ten of its 
provinces and two of its three territories to the GPA, thereby opening up public 
procurement contracts in this multi-billion dollar sector to foreign suppliers of goods 
and services.  Various exceptions to Canada’s sub-central commitments are outlined, 
including notably highway projects and some key sectors in Ontario and Quebec.  A 
recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada denying foreign firms access to the 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal challenge procedure for all contracts not 
covered by the GPA is discussed as are two new inter-provincial trade agreements 
that inter alia aim to liberalize procurement regulations for Canadian firms only.  
Overall Canada’s sub-central commitments should be viewed as a positive step in 
procurement market liberalization in line with the trend of WTO GPA coverage 
enlargement. 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
Canada’s failure to commit its sub-central governments to the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) Agreement on Government Procurement (‘GPA’) 1  was 
previously discussed in an article by this author wherein it was suggested that the 
reasons for the Canada’s omission could be found in the provinces’ desire to prevent 
American corporations from out-competing local firms for government contracts, as 
well as an unwillingness to outsource any governmental purchasing to either other 
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provinces or to the private sector generally. 2  The lack of sub-central government 
commitment under the WTO GPA was regretful because it represented a missed 
opportunity in terms of securing best value outsourcing to international contractors 
around the world, as well as for Canadian companies that would be consequently 
excluded from sub-central government procurement contracts in the many GPA 
Parties that had committed their regional governments, notably Japan, South Korea 
and Switzerland.  This view is obviously premised on the assumption that 
membership in the GPA actually results in an increase in the awarding of public 
procurement contracts to foreign firms, a notion which has been challenged by recent 
empirical work on services procurement in Japan and Switzerland. 3   On a more 
theoretical level, Canada’s failure to list its sub-central governments exposed an often 
overlooked fallacy of public international law – international undertakings are largely 
meaningless if the constituent entities within federal states are constitutionally 
empowered to ignore the obligations that their central governments have pledged.  
Encouragingly, this situation changed in early 2010, with the Canadian government’s 
new GPA commitment to open its sub-central government procurement contracts to 
international bidding on an equal footing with domestic companies.  This article will 
outline the current regime of Canada’s sub-central commitments under the WTO GPA 
as well as highlight some important legal concerns raised by Canada’s new approach 
to regional procurement from international suppliers. Canada’s procurement 
commitments under the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’) are 
beyond the scope of this article, as are Canada’s various associated bilateral 
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commitments. We will begin by briefly discussing the revised WTO GPA and the 
existing sub-central commitments of the signatory states. 
 
2.  The WTO GPA 
The WTO implemented an earlier GPA during the Tokyo Round of negotiations to 
foster international competition in procurement among member governments in a 
transparent manner free from discrimination. The Tokyo Round GPA, like the 
existing Uruguay Round GPA that came after it made provision for the inclusion of 
sub-central entities because of the economic significance of such transactions in the 
many states where regional governments have a mandate to deliver a large component 
of governmental functions.  On average around the world between 10-15% of a state’s 
GDP is believed to be spent in public procurement.4 Moreover, procurement at the 
regional level, as at the national level, can be implemented to achieve social or 
economic ends that often conflict with the principles of free trade, requiring more 
specific regulation to capture legitimate, non discriminatory policy exceptions.  
Accession to the plurilateral (optional) Uruguay Round GPA, which came into 
force on 1 January 1996 is available to all member states of the WTO and currently 
the GPA has 40 signatories including the 27 states of the enlarged EU.5 While this is a 
relatively small number given the size of the WTO’s total membership 
(approximately one fifth), accession to the GPA is expected to rise in the future.6  
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This may be in large part due to pressure from existing Parties, especially China, 
which committed to the GPA as a condition of their accession to the WTO and 
currently has observer status.7 Generally speaking the GPA is designed to open up as 
much government procurement to international competition by making all regulations 
with respect to procurement more transparent and non-protectionist in favour of local 
suppliers. The existing GPA is under a process of revision, and a tentative new text 
will simplify the tendering process.8 
GPA Parties are required to accord the products, services and suppliers of any 
other Party treatment that is “no less favourable” than they accord to their domestic 
services and suppliers, so-called Most Favoured Party treatment.9  Parties may also 
not discriminate among goods, services and suppliers of other Parties.10 Furthermore, 
each Party is required to ensure that its entities do not treat domestic suppliers 
differently on the basis of a greater or lesser degree of foreign affiliation or ownership 
as well as to ensure that its entities do not discriminate against domestic suppliers 
because their good or service is produced in the territory of another Party.11  Unlike 
other WTO Agreements, there is no general most favoured nation principle within the 
WTO agreements that allows members that are not signatories to the GPA to benefit 
from concessions made within it by GPA parties.  
                                                                                                                                       
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1356142> ; C Yukins and S Schooner, “Incrementalism: Eroding the 
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Contracts for the supply of goods are covered by the GPA unless expressly 
excluded and exceptions are normally found in the area of defence procurement, as 
seen, for example, in the EU’s Annex I.  Services are typically covered only if they 
are expressly listed in Annex IV of each of the Parties.  Annex V covers construction 
services, for which most Parties have committed coverage, although financial 
thresholds for construction, expressed as the Special Drawing Right (‘SDR’)12 vary 
considerably from Party to Party but are typically higher than for goods or services, 
illustrating the need for large civil engineering companies to export high quality 
design as well as engineering and management services to the global marketplace.13 
Thresholds for goods and services is 130,000 for all central government parties, 
although sub-central levels also vary considerably. Under Article 2.2 of the GPA, 
Parties can specify exclusions from coverage in their Annexes, which as we shall see, 
Canada’s provinces have done extensively.  
The GPA adopts the “positive list” approach – parties specify the procurement 
(by entity and service) that is to be regulated and any procurement that is not 
explicitly mentioned is excluded. Which government entities are covered by the GPA 
is not obvious because the status of bodies as independent government entities, 
commercial state-owned companies and joint venture (public/private) enterprises can 
be unclear, particularly in relation to non-market and transition economies.14 GPA 
coverage is expressly extended to sub-central/regional governments as specified by 
the Parties under Annex II to the agreement. As GPA negotiations have been 
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conducted on a bilateral basis based on reciprocity, sub-federal purchasing by one 
state is open only to those states which list their own sub-federal purchases – an 
approach which has led to many reciprocity-based derogations being included in the 
Annexes.15 Article VII of the GPA requires that tendering procedures of each Party 
shall be applied in an open and non-discriminatory manner.  Under Article VIII, any 
conditions for participation in a tender must be published in a timely manner and 
conditions shall not be applied a way that discriminates against foreign suppliers.  
Article XVIII requires that Parties maintain high levels of transparency generally with 
respect to tendering rules and access to challenge procedures, which are mandated 
under Article XX: in the event of a complaint by a supplier that a Party has been in 
breach of its GPA obligations, each Party must provide non-discriminatory, timely, 
transparent and effective procedures through which a challenge may be brought.  
Such challenges must be heard by a court or by an impartial independent review body 
with the powers to take evidence in public and provide reasons for its decision.   
Article XXIII of the GPA contains exemptions for essential security and national 
defence matters as well as general exemptions that mirror the language of GATT 
Article XX including public morals, animal and plant life or health.  
 Among the most economically important of the sub-central entities covered by 
the GPA are those of Japan. Japan’s regions had in the past engaged in the 
discriminatory practice of preferring suppliers that maintained local offices but now 
all of the nation’s forty-seven prefectures are covered by the GPA, subject to several 
exceptions including notably the supply and distribution of electricity.16 In order to 
implement the agreement, Japan’s central government amended legislation regarding 
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local autonomy and issued formal guidance outlining the procurement objectives. The 
regions were then free to establish their own procedures and rules to implement the 
procurement objectives subject to constraints imposed by the central government.17 
Procurement from foreign sources in 2007 accounted for approximately 9 per cent 
(both goods and services) of all Japanese government procurement. More than 
fourteen trillion yen were spent in public purchases of goods and services by all level 
of governments in Japan in 2007.18  There are no statistics available for Japanese 
procurement specifically at the sub-central level, but the largest ten procuring bodies 
were all federal.19 
 Korea also lists all sub-central administrative government entities in its GPA 
Annex II, including six municipalities and nine regions20 as does Switzerland, which 
lists all twenty-three cantons.21 Korean sub-central entities maintain exclusions for 
procurements from small businesses. Iceland does not list any regional governments 
but its Annex II states that “contracting local public authorities including all 
municipalities” are included22 and a similar approach is taken by Liechtenstein which 
simply lists “public authorities at local level” which may imply that regional 
governments are not included.23 Israel’s Annex II specifies municipal entities only.24 
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Norway lists all of its 19 counties (without naming them) and 435 municipalities.25 
Annex II does not apply to Singapore, Hong Kong China and the Netherlands with 
respect to Aruba because those states do not have sub-central agencies.26 The EC’s 
Annex II under the GPA covers all existing regional and local governments without 
specifying them by name.27 Under its extensive General Notes to the GPA, the EC 
imposes numerous derogations directed at specific members in relation to particular 
industries. 28  There are no statistics available for the quantity of EC foreign 
procurement at the sub-central level. The EC’s Annex II, like those of most members, 
commits goods and services above a threshold value of 200,000 SDR.29 
The USA originally allowed only limited state-level coverage when the GPA 
agreement was originally concluded in December 1993 because it was unwilling to 
provide coverage at the state level without agreement from those entities themselves. 
According to Reich, the US claimed that domestic political difficulties in binding 
state governments were responsible for failure to negotiate more comprehensive state 
coverage. 30  The federal government was relegated to suggesting a voluntary 
compliance plan which would attempt to obtain the broadest possible coverage of sub-
central agencies.31 Procurement policies at the state level have been used as tools of 
censure towards foreign states, as seen most notably in the state government of 
Massachusetts’ exclusion of procurement by Burmese firms because of that country’s 
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 Singapore GPA Annex II; Hong Kong GPA Annex II; Netherlands GPA Annex II 
27
 EC GPA Annex II 
28
 For further discussion of European procurement rules see Y Allain “New European Directives on 
Public Procurement: Change or Continuity”  35 Public Contract Law Journal 517(2006) and C Bovis, 
“Public Procurement in the European Union: A Critical Analysis of the New Regime” 33 Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 29 (2006)  
29
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human rights record.32 The US sub-central coverage has expanded significantly after 
efforts of the federal government to encourage states to enter into the bi-lateral 
agreement with the EU based on the guiding principle of reciprocity that was required 
under the GPA Article XXIV.7. The existing sub-central coverage of states within the 
US is not complete. Thirty seven states are partially covered, including those whose 
markets had been the most closed, but some states have no government procurement 
regulation whatsoever, including Ohio and both Carolinas.  Threshold values for sub-
central procurement are set at 355,000 SDR for supplies and services and 5 million 
SDR for construction.33 The US Annex II retains an exemption for distressed areas 
and minority owned businesses,34 and environmental protection.35 Annex I contains 
small businesses set-asides which also apply to sub-central procurement. Before we 
explore Canada’s new sub-central commitments under the GPA, it is instructive to 
first consider the nature of government procurement activities in Canada. 
 
 
3.  Sub-Central Government Procurement in Canada 
Canada consists of ten provinces and three territories, four of which have populations 
above three million: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta.36 Although the 
federal executive government has the exclusive jurisdiction to negotiate and accede to 
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Policy vol 6:2 217 (2006) 
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 January 2010 figures, source: Statistics Canada www.statscan.gc.ca (last accessed June 2010)  
10 
 
treaties under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the ability to implement 
international agreements into domestic law can (and frequently does) fall within the 
jurisdiction of the provinces as listed in section 92 of the Constitution Act. A treaty 
that requires the expenditure of public monies or purports to change existing law 
(such as an agreement modifying government procurement policy) is not directly 
applicable under Canadian law unless there is an act specifically incorporating it into 
domestic law.37  Consequently an Act passed by the federal parliament would be 
inapplicable in relation to provincial procurement decisions because provincial 
jurisdiction encompasses “local works and undertakings”, “property …within the 
province” and “all matters of a merely local or private nature.” 38  Procurement 
activities, either relating to goods, services or construction, clearly fall under one or 
more of these fairly broad provincial powers. Additional WTO commitments might 
well encroach upon matters that fall within the provincial domain and this would 
require cooperation with the nation’s sub-central governments.39 It should also be 
recognized that as treaty making is an exclusively federal power, international law 
does not recognize any international arrangements between provinces and foreign 
states. Therefore sub-central commitment to the WTO GPA is extended to the WTO 
by Canada on behalf of its provinces, not through the provinces directly, which are 
themselves not WTO members.   
Individual procurement expenditures of the Canadian provinces are 
considerably less than that of the federal government, but when taken in aggregate 
more than twice as much government procurement in Canada is done at the sub-
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central level compared to the federal level, reflecting the largely de-centralized nature 
of governmental administration in Canada.  More than 17 billion Canadian dollars 
was spent by the provincial governments in procurement compared to $7.86 billion 
for the federal government in 2007-08, the most recent year for which data is 
available.40  Together these figures account for only about 2% of Canada’s GDP, 
which it should be said is far lower than the world average for expenditures on public 
procurement, as noted above.41 The province with the largest procurement figure is 
Alberta, which spent $4.3 billion in 2007-08, mostly linked to oil related projects and 
infrastructure.  The next largest spenders of that year were the governments of Quebec 
($3.6 billion); Ontario, by far Canada’s largest province by population ($3.18 billion) 
and British Columbia ($2.2 billion).42  Although Canadian provincial governments 
clearly represent sizable markets for international firms, no publicly accessible 
records of the location of the supplying firms is kept by any province and the extent of 
provincial procurement from international suppliers is unknown.  Under the auspices 
of the Internal Trade Secretariat, the federal and provincial governments of Canada 
maintain the website MARCAN which consolidates data regarding public sector 
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 Source: <http://www.marcan.net>  Note that provincial statistics include procurement by municipal 
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see how the 2010 Winter Olympics in British Columbia and the 2010 G-20 Conference in Toronto, 
Ontario (which reportedly cost $1B) will be reflected in forthcoming federal and provincial 
procurement figures. 
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tenders and also provides an overview of rules for public sector procurement, as well 
as information on complaints procedures for bidders, largely satisfying the GPA’s 
transparency requirements.43  An equally useful private sector database can be found 
on the MERX website which lists all federal and provincial procurement 
opportunities, as well as other private sector tenders.44  Accessing data on public 
sector opportunities on both websites is free and should conform to GPA requirements 
on transparency. The websites are both comprehensive and user friendly, however if a 
foreign supplier did not know of their existence it is not clear that this information 
would be easy to obtain through Canada’s federal government or various provincial 
government website portals.   
Sub-central government procurement in Canada is currently regulated by 
Chapter Five of the Agreement on Internal Trade (‘AIT’) which establishes principles 
of non-discrimination and transparency similar to those of the WTO GPA.45 The AIT 
is a Canadian inter-governmental agreement, not a piece of legislation, and covers 
trade in goods and services between the Canadian provinces, the purpose of which is 
to achieve efficiency and a strong economy.46 The agreement was ratified by all 10 
provinces, the federal government, and the two existing territories in 1995 and 
encompasses procurements in excess of $25,000 for goods and $100,000 for 
services.47 Of the provinces which conduct significant procurement activities, only 
Quebec has formally enacted the AIT into its provincial legislation,48 although all 
parties are expected to maintain procurement practices that conform to its 
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requirements.  Decisions of any provincial government are subject to challenge by the 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (‘CITT’) under the agreement’s dispute 
settlement system. 49  The AIT’s principles of fairness and transparency in the 
tendering process and in bid valuation, which recall those of the GPA, are outlined in 
Articles 505 and 506. As under Article XXIII of the GPA, there are narrow exclusions 
for unforeseeable urgency and national security.50 While the agreement ensures non-
discrimination among Canadian provinces, Article 504(5) of the AIT permits a party 
to accord a price preference of no more than 10 per cent for Canadian content of 
purchased goods, provided that potential suppliers are informed of this policy in 
tender documents, and as long as this does not violate international agreements.  As 
the Art XVI of the GPA specifically prohibits domestic content requirements, any sub 
central or central procurement subject to GPA coverage could not be conditional on 
this 10 per cent Canadian content allowance.51  It should be noted that the Canadian 
AIT has been criticized for its failure to reduce barriers in agriculture or energy as 
well as its inability to force governments to comply with the rulings of the CITT.52 
 
 
4.  Canada’s Sub-Central Government Procurement Commitments under the 
GPA 
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 See further L DiMarzo, ‘Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Agreement on Internal Trade’ 34 
Alberta Law Review 240 (1995). The CITT is also the designated bid challenge authority for NAFTA 
with respect to procurement by the federal government. 
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51
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52
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14 
 
The Canadian federal government acceded to the WTO GPA and the WTO itself 
through the passage of the World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation 
Act53 which was brought into force on 1 January 1996.   As noted above, Canada had 
not committed any of its 13 sub-central provincial governments (10 provinces and 3 
territories) under the GPA for the fourteen year existence of the agreement. However, 
in February 2010 the Canadian government agreed to open provincial, territorial and 
some municipal government procurement contracts to American firms in exchange for 
America’s relinquishing of the “Buy American” requirement of its domestic financial 
aid legislation, allowing Canadian firms to compete for the funds remaining in the 
stimulus package. The US Recovery and Reinvestment Act54 which extended US 
$275 billion to American firms caused much consternation in Canada and was viewed 
as a potential violation of NAFTA as well as WTO rules which mandate equal 
treatment of foreign and domestic firms. Whether or not these domestic economic 
measures represented violations of international trade commitments55 (they have not 
been challenged as such), Canadian companies had clearly been excluded from highly 
lucrative contracts from their largest trading partner. 
The above negotiations with the United States resulted in the Canada-U.S. 
Agreement on Government Procurement56 which provides reciprocal commitments 
with respect to provincial, territorial and state procurement.  As a result, Canada’s 
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 S. C. 1994, c. 47 [assented to 15 December 1994]  
54
 Public Law 111-5, 2009  
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 The extent to which the various “bailout” or “stimulus” packages created by governments around the 
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“emergency” type exceptions, such as GATT Art XIX safeguards.  It is also unlikely that any WTO 
Member would seek redress for such packages because of them being common to all Members: J. Sen 
‘Will Government Bailouts Lead to Trade Wars?’  Global Subsidies Initiative 
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commerciaux/fo/agreement_accord.aspx?lang=eng>  (accessed June 2010) 
15 
 
GPA Annex II now contains extensive international commitments for all ten 
provinces: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan and 
two of the three territories (the Northwest Territories and the Yukon).57 As predicted, 
some of Canada’s sub-central governments, especially the largest three provinces, 
have maintained a number of exceptions to their procurement commitments, notably 
in relation to road projects.  The sub-central governments of Canada each commit 
335,000 SDR to procurement in both goods and services, as well as 5 million SDR to 
construction, this latter figure representing the high demand for infrastructure related 
suppliers in Canada’s vast dispersed primary and secondary industries. These service 
and goods commitment levels are more than twice that of the federal government and 
considerably more than the sub-central commitments of Japan’s58, Switzerland’s59 and 
the European Union’s60 regions and although they are identical to those of the US 
states and the US GPA Annex II.  
The province of Alberta commits all ministries and agencies but specifically 
exempts some agencies responsible for political administration, such as the provincial 
Legislative Assembly as well as the Information and Privacy Commissioner and the 
Office of the Ombudsman. Similarly, British Columbia commits all of its agencies 
and departments except its Legislative Assembly. 61   The provinces of Manitoba, 
                                               
57
 GPA Annex II, (19 March 2010).  The third territory Nunavut, with a population of only 32,000 and 
with no available procurement statistics, was not included. 
58
 Japan’s sub-central goods thresholds are 200,000 SDR and only 15,000 for construction.  No 
specified limit is provided for the listed services, GPA Annex II  
59
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million SDR, GPA Annex II 
60
 The European Unions goods and services commitments are at 200,000 SDR with construction at 5 
million SDR , GPA Annex II 
61
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Newfoundland and Labrador and the Yukon Territory make sweeping commitments 
for all of their respective departments and agencies.  New Brunswick appears to have 
covered virtually all of its agencies and departments, although it has chosen to do so 
by an exhaustive positive-list approach with no expressly mentioned exemptions. 
Nova Scotia opens all of its agencies and departments except Emergency Health 
Services.  The smallest province by population and area, Prince Edward Island lists all 
agencies and departments, but specifically exempts construction materials for use in 
highway construction and maintenance.   The Northwest Territories, the largest region 
in size but with a minimal population lists all departments and agencies but excludes 
contracts subject to a federal government designed incentive policy to attract settlers 
to the remote north.    
Ontario and Quebec, the two largest provinces, list some exceptions that could 
denote significant lost opportunities for international suppliers.  Otherwise 
committing all departments and agencies, Ontario specifically excludes urban rail and 
urban transportation equipment, systems, components and materials, as well as all 
project-related materials of iron or steel, as well as highway construction.  There are 
two probable reasons for these derogations – these activities are largely supplied by 
local firms that would risk losing essential public contracts were they to face 
international competition and they are in line with exceptions retained by most US 
states. Quebec’s exemptions are of a different character, but equally telling.  That 
province commits all agencies and departments, but its exemptions include 
procurement of cultural or artistic goods and services, seedling (tree) production, and 
production of construction-grade steel.  Derogations for trees and steel reflect key 
                                                                                                                                       
Nou, ‘Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity Through Procurement Contracts’ 118: 4 
Yale Law Journal 744 (2009) 
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industries vital to Quebec’s domestic economy, and the cultural exception expresses 
the clear, and often politically controversial, desire for the province to conserve its 
French heritage in a predominately English speaking country (and world).62 Among 
the most significant limitations to Canada’s sub-central commitments under the GPA 
can be found among the general derogations that apply to all provinces.  First, 
Canada’s Annex II does not apply to highway projects, a reservation likely enacted in 
response to various American states’ refusal to commit in this area.  Second, the 
provinces do not commit to procurement relating to projects designed to help 
economically distressed areas, Aboriginal peoples63 or to improve the environment64.  
Taken together these exemptions could represent major impediments to foreign 
suppliers seeking sub-central public contracts in Canada. 
Two recent regional trade agreements have been concluded in Canada that 
could have a further effect on international public procurement bids at the sub-central 
level. First, in early 2010, the Trade Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement 
(‘TILMA’) went into effect among its three signatory members, the provincial 
governments of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan (the three western 
provinces).65  TILMA substantially integrates the economies of the three provinces, 
eliminating or reducing any barriers to trade, investment and labour. Article 14 of the 
agreement provides that the three Parties will allow open and non-discriminatory 
access to virtually all sub-central government contracts above a minimum threshold of 
                                               
62
 Cultural exemptions claimed by Canada and, interestingly, France, were among the reasons that the 
negotiations OECD’s Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment failed: M Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment (3ed, Cambridge, 2010) at 273.  One suspects that Canada’s 
objections therein were almost entirely due to Quebec’s concerns for safeguarding its French culture 
against American influences in film and television. 
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 On environmental exceptions see Asselt, Van der Grijp and Oosterhuis above note 35 
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 http://www.tilma.ca/pdf/TILMA_Agreement_April2009.pdf (accessed June 2010) 
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$10,000 for goods, $75,000 for services and $100,000 for construction.  Unfortunately 
TILMA may undermine these provinces’ WTO GPA commitments because it is 
expressly intended for the benefit of the three provinces and their “persons”66 likely 
meaning companies with an office located in Alberta, British Columbia or 
Saskatchewan or corporations incorporated therein.  Foreign suppliers are therefore 
not entitled to benefit from the agreement’s open procurement guarantees. Secondly, 
the Ontario-Quebec Trade and Cooperation Agreement (‘OQTCA’)67 took effect on 1 
October 2009 intending to facilitate trade and labour mobility between the provinces 
through a reduction in regulatory obstacles, for example by providing for electronic 
tendering procedures in procurement. Article 9 of the agreement, which deals with 
procurement, states that the objectives of the OQTCA are to “ensure equal access to 
procurement to all Quebec and Ontario suppliers” in order to reduce costs with a view 
to strengthening the economy.  Article 9.1 goes on to say that the agreement should 
not be interpreted as providing any rights or conferring any benefits to suppliers, 
enterprises, persons or products that are not “of a Party”, again likely meaning with a 
head office in Ontario or Quebec.  Clearly, then, any reductions in regulatory barriers 
achieved by the OQTCA in the sphere of public procurement will not be enjoyed by 
foreign suppliers, which raises the concern that this agreement may transgress Ontario 
and Quebec’s new WTO GPA obligations with respect to non-discrimination. 
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 Art 2.3 
67
 http://www.ontariocanada.com/ontcan/1medt/downloads/Ontario-
QuebecTradeCooperationAgreement_sept09_en.pdf (accessed June 2010) 
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5.  Overview of Canadian Federal Level Procurement and Tender Challenge 
Issues 
Canada’s ongoing federal government commitments to the WTO GPA represent a 
significant market to international firms: the Canadian federal government spent CDN 
$7.86 billion on the procurement of goods and services in 2007-08.68 This figure 
should be even more attractive to foreign suppliers as Canada remains one of the few 
developed countries that has not enacted severe austerity measures to curb public 
sector expenditure.  In addition to the new provincial commitments, the federal 
government entities to which the GPA applies, set out in Annex I, cover a wide range 
of federal agencies from the Supreme Court to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
For federal level procurement the Procurement Review Committee will assess 
potential socio-economic benefits of public purchases that are valued in excess of 
CDN $2 million and will submit recommendations to the Treasury Board which may 
permit the award of a tender to a contractor that does not offer the lowest price.69 
Among its policy-oriented purchasing is a preferential government contracting policy 
in favour of Canadian Aboriginal businesses which was implemented in 1996.70 
Monetary thresholds are set every two years and Canada’s are currently at 130,000 
SDRs for goods and services and 5 million for construction, this latter unusually high 
figure denoting the large need for building projects in Canada’s industry led 
economy.71 The authority for federal government procurement is exercised by the 
Treasury Board, which is a committee of the Privy Council (Cabinet) and is located in 
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 Source: MARCAN  <http://www.marcan.net/index_en/procure.htm>  (last accessed June 2010). 
69
 Public Works and Government Services Supply Manual, s 5.070. 
70
 Art. 24 of the Nunavut Agreement.  Aboriginal preferences also involve Comprehensive Land 
Claims in the far north and assistance with small businesses, see A Van Dyk, ‘Recent Changes in the 
Canadian Government’s Contracting Policy’, (2007) 7 Public Procurement Law Review 110 at 112-13. 
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the national capital of Ottawa. 72  The CITT provides judicial oversight to the 
implementation of the agreement 73  fulfilling the GPA’s above noted Article XX 
requirement that domestic bid challenge procedures are maintained within each 
country by an impartial tribunal. Matters falling under the scope of Canada’s sub-
central or federal GPA obligations are “designated contracts” 74  and as such 
complaints regarding associated procurement decisions may be brought by foreign 
companies to the CITT.  However, the Supreme Court of Canada (‘SCC’)’s recent 
decision in AGC v Northrop Grumman75  has now established that recourse to the 
CITT tribunal is only available for foreign suppliers with respect to procurement that 
is explicitly covered by Canada’s GPA (and other equivalent) commitments.  The 
SCC ruled in Northrop that unless enacted into domestic law, international trade 
agreements are merely political statements rather than an enforceable legal regime.  
Some further discussion of the Northrop decision is warranted.  US company 
Northrop Grumman’s complaint originated from a government procurement contract 
with Canada’s federal Public Works and Government Services Canada (‘PWGSC’) 
for the purchase of infrared sensor pods (not covered by Canada’s existing federal 
GPA commitment) in which the PWGSC allegedly evaluated the bids in a manner 
inconsistent with the published criteria. PWGSC argued at the CITT that Northrop did 
not have standing to bring a complaint as it was not a Canadian company.  The CITT 
had ruled that a foreign company could bring a complaint, and PWGSC applied for 
judicial review of the decision by the Federal Court of Appeal, which overturned the 
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 For a discussion of the methodology of federal government procurement in Canada, see Taylor and 
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 Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act R.S. 1985 c.47 s.30.1 definition of “government 
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decision of the CITT.  This decision was appealed by Northrop to the SCC, which 
unanimously dismissed the appeal, ruling that Northrop, as a non-Canadian supplier, 
did not have standing to bring a complaint under the AIT before the CITT.  As a 
matter of administrative law, access to the CITT as a statutory tribunal must be found 
in the statutory instrument.  The relevant statutory provision, Article 30.11(1) of the 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act76, allows potential suppliers to complain to 
the CITT in relation to designated contracts. “Designated contract” as defined in the 
regulations, refers to a contract described under the WTO GPA, NAFTA and the AIT 
as well as the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement.  Northrop argued that it had 
standing under these agreements and that there was no requirement to be a Canadian 
supplier for the complaint provisions to take effect.  The SCC disagreed, concluding 
that only suppliers with an office in Canada qualify as Canadian suppliers and 
therefore have standing to bring a complaint under the CITT.  In reaching this 
decision the court pointed to Article 501 of AIT which states that the purpose of the 
agreement is to “establish a framework that will ensure equal access to procurement 
for all Canadian suppliers.” Given this objective, the AIT should be viewed as 
basically a “domestic free-trade agreement” negotiated between federal, provincial 
and territorial governments within Canada.  Presumably this logic would also apply to 
the above noted TILMA and OQTCA.   
As Northrop lacked a place of business in Canada (the territorial scope of the 
AIT) it was not entitled to have standing under the agreement, although a Northrop 
subsidiary may have had standing to bring the complaint. Standing before the CITT 
could otherwise only be achieved through negotiation with the home state of the 
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supplier, which is demonstrated through Canada’s specific GPA commitments. The 
SCC interestingly commented that if Northrop’s argument had been accepted and 
foreign companies could have standing to bring complaints under the AIT to the 
CITT, then this would deprive Canada of an important concession that it could make 
in trade negotiations, for example under NAFTA or the WTO GPA.  Furthermore, the 
court stated that Article 504(6) which establishes the ability of a party to the AIT (a 
Canadian province or territory or the federal government) to limit its tendering to 
Canadian suppliers on condition that all qualified suppliers be informed of the 
decision, is merely a statement that the AIT will not supersede Canada’s international 
agreements, it does not create enforceable obligations to foreign suppliers. Therefore, 
foreign companies supplying a good or service to a the Canadian federal government 
or any provincial government that is not explicitly covered by Canada’s GPA 
commitment (or a similar commitment under NAFTA) must have a place of business 
in Canada in order to use the CITT’s complaint procedures. Similar nationality 
requirements are evidently also required to take advantage of TILMA and the 
OQTCA regional trade agreements. Otherwise, foreign suppliers must bring 
complaints via judicial review through the Federal Court of Canada for federal 
procurement contracts or the superior courts of any of the provinces for provincial 
tendering challenges.77  While the SCC did not say so explicitly, the requirement of a 
place of business in Canada to access Canada’s trade tribunal and to take advantage of 
its regional agreements in western and central Canada may act as an incentive for 
companies to establish a commercial presence in the country, which may in turn 
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increase foreign direct investment flows into Canada, providing tax revenue as well as 
potential employment and training opportunities for Canadians. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Canada’s sub-central commitments under the WTO GPA should be viewed in a 
positive light as the change in policy should open Canadian provincial markets to 
international suppliers and in so doing offer the best value-for-money goods and 
services. Moreover, the provinces’ commitments should offer new opportunities for 
Canadian firms seeking to supply sub-central government contracts abroad.  Still, the 
practical impact of the new commitments for Canadian firms may be limited in that 
several US states remain outside the US’ Annex II GPA coverage, including the 
traditionally important markets of Ohio and both Carolinas. Other US states retain 
carve-outs for such sectors as roads and public transit, which may explain the 
Canadian provinces’ unwillingness to commit to these areas. As some measures of the 
new Canada-US Government Procurement Agreement are temporary 78 , it is 
conceivable that the Canada’s sub central GPA coverage could be further restricted in 
the event that a second US financial stimulus package were to re-establish American-
only purchasing requirements or add additional sectors to the existing exemptions.79 
The effect of the preference for local firms seen in the new TILMA and OQTCA 
agreements on Canada’s WTO GPA obligations also remains to be seen.  
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Until further developments crystallize, Canada’s much anticipated reversal of 
its sub-central omissions to the GPA must be viewed as a positive move on the part of 
Canadian provinces to integrate their economies with those of the other sub-central 
GPA signatories and should offer lower cost methods of improving the aging 
infrastructures and underperforming services in many regions of Canada.  Canada’s 
new commitment to openness in sub-central procurement may ultimately facilitate the 
creation of a highly anticipated bilateral trade agreement between Canada and the EU, 
which had previously viewed Canada’s refusal to commit its sub-federal units to 
government procurement liberalization with scorn.80 What this change in Canada’s 
attitude reveals about this author’s earlier conjecture regarding the reasons for the 
provinces’ previous non-commitment, including regionalism and a small-government 
approach81 is unclear as it is suggested that both these factors remain, although the 
extent to which this is so is left for others to consider.  More evident, however, is 
Canada’s intimate and enduring economic relationship with its southern neighbour, 
the integrity of which was the catalyst for Canada’s eventual sub-central GPA 
acquiescence.  Thus, in addition to recent worldwide praise for its regulatory 
sensibility in the banking sector in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis82 and as 
a model for deficit reduction83 Canada can now be admired for its commitment to 
international trade liberalization in the important sector of sub-central public 
procurement, be as it may somewhat incomplete and overdue. 
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